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RECENT DECISIONS 
CML PROCEDURE - DISCLOSURE OF MINUTES WHEN GRAND JURY w AS 
UsED FOR PURPOSE OF PREPARING FOR CIVIL ACTION - Three weeks after the 
close of a grand jury investigation of charges of criminal antitrust violations, 
the Government filed a civil complaint against defendants based upon ma-
terials accumulated by the grand jury. Defendants obtained discovery of 
the grand jury transcript,1 but the United States Supreme Court overruled,2 
holding that defendants, by merely showing that the Government had not 
requested an indictment, had not shown "good cause" for discovery under 
rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 The Court did indicate 
that a use by the Government of the grand jury for the sole purpose of pre-
paring for a civil action would result in a subversion of the grand jury 
process and wholesale discovery of the transcript would be allowed. De-
fendants then filed interrogatories to determine at what point the Govern-
ment decided to abandon the criminal action. On defendant's motion for 
discovery, held, motion granted. If the Government decided at some time 
during the grand jury hearings that it would not seek an indictment and 
nevertheless continued the proceedings, there was a subversion of the grand 
jury as the Supreme Court defined it, and the minutes of the proceedings 
after the Government abandoned the criminal action should be made 
available for defendant's inspection. United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 
174 F. Supp. 233 (D.C.N.J. 1959). 
The policy of affording utmost secrecy to the hearings and deliberations 
of the grand jury has long been recognized.4 One principal exception has 
allowed the prosecuting government to be present at the hearings and to 
retain a copy of the documents and the minutes of the proceedings.5 A 
defendant in a criminal case, however, has been denied access to grand jury 
minutes except in those cases where the courts have determined that justice 
1 United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 19 F.R.D. 122 (D.C. N.J. 1956). 
2 United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677 (1958). 
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 34: "Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor .•• the 
court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce ..• any designated 
documents, papers, books, .•• or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or con-
tain evidence relating to any matters within the scope of the examination .•• and which 
are in his possession, custody, or control .••• " 
4 See, e.g., Collins v. State, 200 Ark. 1027, 1042, 143 S.W .2d 1, 8 (1940); Coblentz v. 
State, 164 Md. 558, 566, 166 Atl. 45, 49 (1933); United States v. Garrson, 291 Fed. 646 
(S.D. N.Y. 1923); Fm. R. CRIM. P. 6 (e); Annot., 127 A.L.R. 272 (1940). For a discussion of 
the historical development of the rule of secrecy of grand jury proceedings, see W1GM0RE, 
EVIDENCE §2360 (3d ed. 1940). 
15 United States v. United States District Court, 238 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 
352 U.S. 981 (1957). See State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 68, 9 A.2d 63, 68 (1939). This 
exception is written into FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 (e): "Disclosure of matters occurring before 
the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the 
attorneys of the government for use in the performance of their duties." 
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requires disclosure.6 Usually the defendant's request has been denied.7 As 
a result, the general thrust of criminal procedure has kept defendants from 
receiving a pre-trial view of evidence to be used against them.8 This atti-
tude is based upon a fear that the accused will explore the Government's 
evidence and attempt to fabricate testimony, suborn perjury, and tamper 
with witnesses.9 On the other hand, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
do not reflect this fear of defendants' subterfuge, but rather encourage the 
exchange of information between parties.10 Indeed, in civil antitrust ac-
tions, deposition hearings must be open to the public.11 The Supreme 
Court's earlier ruling in the controversy involved in the principal case gave 
priority to the policy of secrecy over the more liberal attitude of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure as expressed in the discovery device of rule 34.12 
That holding is open to criticism, since the policy supporting secrecy loses 
much of its meaning after the grand jury has terminated its hearings and 
disposed of the case.1 3 Basically, the secrecy of the grand jury was designed 
to protect defendants, witnesses, jurors,14 and the scheme of the adminis-
6 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940). The Supreme 
Court has refused to extend the rationale of Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), 
to the disclosure of grand jury minutes. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 
U.S. 395 (1959). See The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 183 (1959); 13 
VANn. L. REv. 404 (1959). 
7 E.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1957) afj'd, 360 U.S. 367 (1959); 
see Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 454 (1958), and cases collected therein. 
Two principal areas where defendants have been allowed access to the grand jury minutes 
are where minutes are sought to be used (1) for impeachment of a government witness 
during the trial, United States v. Alper, 156 F.2d 222, 226 (2d Cir. 1946); and (2) for 
examination of defendant's own testimony before the grand jury when he is accused of 
making perjurious statements at that time, United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954). 
8 See generally Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 626 (1951). Attempts by the defendant to 
obtain the grand jury minutes through discovery devices available in the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure have been likewise unsuccessful, United States v. Mesarosh, 13 
F.R.D. 180 (W.D. Pa. 1952); United States v. Stein, 18 F.R.D. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
9 See United States v. Ben Grunstein and Sons, 137 F. Supp. 197, 201 (D.C. N.J. 1955). 
10 See note 3 supra. "The various instruments of discovery now serve .•• as a device 
for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, rela-
tive to those issues ..•. The way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for 
the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial." 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947); see generally Pike &: Willis, The New 
Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure, 38 CoLUM. L. REv. 1179, 1436 (1938). 
11 37 Stat. 731 (1913), 15 U .S.C. §30 (1958). 
12 For a criticism of this holding, see Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 606, 614 (1959). 
13 The traditional policy reasons for the rule of secrecy of the grand jury are listed 
in United States v. Rose, supra note 7, at 628: "(1) To prevent the escape of those whose 
indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in 
its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from im-
portuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering, with the 
witnesses who may testify before grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted 
by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information 
with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is e.xoner-
ated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense 
of standing trial where there is no probability of guilt." 
14 See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2360 (3d ed. 1940). 
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tration of justice.11> Certainly defendants did not need protection in the 
principal case, for they were requesting disclosure. Witnesses cannot expect 
protection from the disclosure of their testimony since they might have been 
forced to reveal the same information in a criminal trial if the grand jury 
had returned an indictment.16 The protection needed for the jurors at 
this point is limited to a freedom from disclosure of their votes and expres-
sions of opinions, but these votes and opinions were not the subject of 
discovery in the principal case.I 7 And, as noted earlier, liberal discovery 
is consistent with the prevailing notions concerning the administration of 
justice in civil cases in the federal courts.18 Where the traditional reasons 
for grand jury secrecy are not applicable, it is difficult to justify the tactical 
advantage received by the Government when such secrecy is, neverthe-
less, afforded. The Government receives the benefits of the broad investi-
gative powers of the grand jury without having to make known the weak-
nesses uncovered.10 A more objectionable extension of the rationale of the 
Supreme Court may exist where administrative agencies are allowed access 
to grand jury minutes.20 It would be unfair to deny respondents the right to 
examine the minutes in such cases. Since the agency is usually entrusted 
with the adjudication as well as the prosecution of a case, it could be con-
sidering evidence that respondent could not combat.21 
Although the same policy considerations which were presented to the 
Supreme Court were presented in the present motion,22 the holding and 
dictum of the Supreme Court require a distinction to be made between 
information obtained through the grand jury by intentional subversion 
and that received pursuant to an honest attempt to seek an indictment.23 
Therefore, the court in the principal case was required to make a somewhat 
artificial distinction. It is clear that if the Government calls a grand jury 
for the sole purpose of gathering evidence for a civil case, the secrecy of 
11> "If defendants were entitled to inspection of grand jury minutes in all cases without 
regard to the merit of their requests the resulting delay in disposing of cases would add 
appreciably to the burden of administering criminal justice in the Federal Courts,'' United 
States v. Geller, 154 F. Supp. 727, 729 n.I (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also Judge Learned Hand's 
discussion in United States v. Garrson, supra note 4. 
10 See W1cMoRE, EVIDENCE §2362 (3d ed. 1940); but see Note, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 1089, 
1092 (I 959). 
17 See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2361 (3d ed. 1940). 
18 See note IO supra. 
10 For a description of the investigative powers of the grand jury, see generally 
Dession &: Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L.J. 687 (1932). 
The Government's use is inhibited by the defendant's right to use grand jury transcript 
for impeachment purposes. See note 7 supra. 
20 Compare In re Bullock, 103 F. Supp. 639 (D. D.C. 1952), and Application of Scro, 
108 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Kings County Ct. 1951), with Application of Bar Ass'n of Erie County, 
47 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Erie County Ct. 1944). 
21 The legality of such procedure is questionable, but it is very difficult to restrain an 
agency from such activity. See COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 169 (1951). 
22 See PUTIXAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 122 (1953); ORFIELD, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 168 (1947). 
23 United States v. Proctor & Gamble, supra note 8. 
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the grand jury should be discarded; otherwise the grand jury could become 
a part of the structure of our civil procedure through the tactics of the 
Department of Justice.24 But regardless of the Government's motives in 
using a grand jury, the effect on the litigation is the same.25 Since the court 
in the principal case was limited by the holding of the Supreme Court, the 
result is desirable in that it attempts to restore some of the liberality of the 
Civil Rules. But so long as the rule of secrecy is followed in civil cases in 
which the Government is a litigant, a portion of the philosophy of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be impaired.26 
L. Vastine Stabler, Jr., S.Ed. 
24 These tactics were approved by Honorable Stanley N. Barnes, then Assistant Attor-
ney General of the United States in charge of the antitrust division, before the Special Anti-
trust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, May 12, 1955, BUREAU OF NATIONAL 
.AFFAIRS, REPORT 350. 
25 See Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in United States v. Proctor &: Gamble, supra note 2, 
at 689. 
26 Congress has been considering new procedure which will allow the government 
pre-complaint discovery in civil antitrust actions. Such a solution should alleviate the 
problem of the principal case. For a discussion of the competing alternatives, see Perry & 
Simon, The Civil Investigative Demand: New Fact-Finding Powers for the Antitrust 
Division, 58 MICH. L. REv. 855 (1960). 
